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ABSTRACT
The introduction of Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs)
enables great potential for improving road traffic flow and
especially active safety applications such as cooperative adap-
tive cruise control (CACC). Such applications not only rely on
continuous broadcast of vehicle state information (beacons)
of all vehicles, but also have strict real-time requirements.
Regarding automotive E/E architectures this continuous
broadcasting adds heavy internal E/E data traffic that needs
to be processed in real-time by Electronic Control Units
(ECUs). In this work we address this issue by proposing
a novel cluster-based message evaluation methodology to
significantly reduce internal E/E network traffic by discard-
ing irrelevant messages. The approach is only depending
on information received over beacons. It combines a vehicle
clustering strategy as well as network and vehicle state mon-
itoring capabilities in order to correctly evaluate messages
under real-time constraints. The proposed methodology is
modeled inside an abstract ECU. It is evaluated by simulat-
ing a model-based CACC application under different traffic
scenarios. It is shown that a significant reduction of messages
is achievable, while still guaranteeing accident-free behavior
of CACC.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.6.2 [Simulation and Modeling]: Simulation Languages;
I.6.5 [Simulation and Modeling]: Model Development;
I.6.3 [Simulation and Modeling]: Applications
General Terms
Design, Languages
Keywords
V2X Message Evaluation, WAVE, E/E-Architectures, Co-
Simulation, Heterogeneous Modelling
1. INTRODUCTION
Today, the electric/electronic (E/E) architecture of modern
cars is a distributed network of embedded systems, con-
sisting of several bus systems, dozens of electronic control
units (ECUs) and hundreds of sensors and actuators. Due
to the continuous rising number of functions, current E/E
architectures are evolving towards new design principles like
standardization, encapsulation and centralization [1]. This
situation is aggravated by the integration of new technolo-
gies like Vehicle-to-X communication (V2XC). V2XC forms
the basis for improved safety, efficient traffic management
and infotainment. Communication between vehicles in such
vehicular networks is referred to as Dedicated Short Range
Communication (DSRC). DSRC is based on IEEE standards
802.11p [2] and 1609 Wireless Access in Vehicular Environ-
ments (WAVE) [3] protocol stack. For active safety appli-
cations like Cooperative Adpative Cruise Control (CACC),
it is assumed that every vehicle is equipped with a V2X
ECU, periodically broadcasting its current state containing
position, speed, acceleration, and direction to its surrounding
neighbors as beacons. A beacon’s format is standardized by
[4] and also called Basic Safety Message (BSM). Especially at
high traffic densities with hundreds of vehicles in range, this
results in an enormous message appearance per time unit. It
increases not only wireless channel load but also signature
verification efforts and communication latencies in internal
E/E networks [5]. The latter is crucial for safety-critical
functions like CACC, which rely on information updated
periodically [6].
One challenge often addressed within this context is con-
trolling the load of the wireless channel to reduce packet
losses and increase reception rate especially of safety related
packets. Nevertheless, the received packets still need to be
processed and routed through the internal E/E architecture.
The latter is typically a priori designed as a closed system not
capable to process and route the additional V2X messages.
Another problem often addressed is fair data dissemination in
the whole network which is, however, not suitable for safety
applications, since it could harm real-time requirements of
individual applications. Overall, most recent works look at a
vehicle as a concentrated point, neglecting internal E/E ar-
chitecture processing and communication efforts. Therefore,
in [7] we developed an extensible tool chain that targets ex-
ploration, validation and verification of modern V2X-enabled
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automotive E/E architectures. Especially it supports hetero-
geneous model composition and distributed co-simulation of
E/E architecture models together with its environment and
active safety-critical applications, e.g. CACC. Fig. 1 shows
a typical (simplified) E/E architecture that can be found in
current vehicles.
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Figure 1: V2X-enabled E/E Architecture
Concurrently considering E/E characteristics with prioritized
data evaluation and selection for safety-critical applications
in order to reduce internal E/E processing and communica-
tion efforts are regarded insufficiently so far. Therefore, we
contribute in this paper to this issue as follows: I) We propose
a novel cluster-based and WAVE compliant V2X message
evaluation strategy for V2X ECUs especially II) taking into
account E/E architecture artifacts in order to reduce inter-
nal E/E network traffic and III) model-based cross-domain
evaluation of a CACC application in combination with E/E
architecture components.
Considering I) we introduce a classification of surrounded
vehicles in Farfield Network (FFN) and Nearfield Network
(NFN) to evaluate incoming beacons in a pipelined man-
ner. Thereby, the approach is fully decentralized by relying
only on data contained in beacons. Since we’re focusing on
safety-critical applications, the message evaluation is based
on WAVE Short Messages (WSMs), because of their mini-
mized protocol overhead optimized for safety purposes (see
Sec. 2).
Furthermore with II) we consider E/E architecture aspects
by providing metrics for monitoring network load in order
to properly adapt message acceptance policies.
Considering III) we show that a significant reduction of mes-
sages that need to be processed during run time is achievable.
The evaluation is based on the co-simulation tool chain de-
veloped in [7]. We use a heterogeneous model-based CACC
application embedded in an abstract model of an E/E ar-
chitecture (cp. Fig. 1) taking into account internal E/E
processing and communication latencies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Sec. 2
a brief review of DSRC is given. Sec. 3 discusses a selection
of related works. The proposed message evaluation strategy
is detailed in Sec. 4. Afterward, the approach is evaluated
with selected case studies in Sec. 5. Sec. 6 gives a short
discussion. Finally, Sec. 7 concludes and presents some
future work.
2. FUNDAMENTALS
DSRC is based on the IEEE 802.11p standard [2]. It is
an extension to the traditional IEEE 802.11 WiFi standard
specifying the PHY and MAC layer to meet the require-
ments in vehicular environments. IEEE 1609 WAVE [3]
family standards incorporate 802.11p, facilitating support
for multi-channel access on the MAC layer (IEEE 1609.4)
as well as higher layer services like security and networking.
One control channel (CCH) is defined for system control
and safety messages, whereas non-safety and high bandwidth
traffic (e.g. UDP traffic) can be transmitted over four to six
service channels (SCH) in Europe and in the U.S. respec-
tively. Furthermore, WAVE provides a minimized protocol
overhead to reduce latency and simplify joining and leaving
basic services. Therewith, a new message type and protocol
was introduced in IEEE 1609.3, the WSM and WAVE Short
Message Protocol (WSMP) respectively. WSMP also sup-
ports a frame based adjustable power and data rate/channel
as well as priority and service identifier (PSID) assignment
allowing cross-layer optimizations. To increase interoperabil-
ity between DSRC applications, application layer standards
like SAE J2735 [4] are also incorporated in the overall pro-
tocol stack. It defines a message set dictionary for DSRC
applications to provide a common language.
3. RELATEDWORK
Since the introduction of VANETs together with its stan-
dards and cooperative applications many approaches were
proposed addressing the control of the wireless channel uti-
lization and improving traffic management and efficiency.
Considering wireless channel control in [8] the authors use a
combined power-rate adaption of beacon transmission based
on estimated tracking error of surrounded vehicles and wire-
less channel occupancy in order to improve dissemination
of safety related data. The authors in [9] build neural net-
works to efficiently adapt the beacon rate, but they rely on
global information provided by Road Side Units. In [10, 11]
they also make use of an adaptive beaconing protocol based
on channel quality and message priority. They furthermore
provide a protocol based on utility functions to optimize over-
all data utilization benefits of arbitrary applications. The
latter, however, is not suitable for cooperative safety applica-
tions, since it could harm individual applications’ real-time
constraints [6].
Clustering mechanisms of vehicles are popular approaches for
efficient data dissemination. [12] and [13] provide complex
clustering algorithms but they mainly focus on stabilization
of clusters itself in order to generalize traffic information and
aim at trust modelling respectively. This approach is not
suitable in our context of safety related message evaluation
which demands for real-time constraints and lightweight
computation complexity.
The emphasis of all previous works lie rather on analysis on
a more coarse grained level like traffic management, trans-
mission efficiency and overall data utilization. Because of
that, in these works vehicles can be considered as a focused
processing point. For validation of E/E architecture compo-
nents, such a point-of-view is insufficient. There is rather
the need for a comprehensive description of a complete V2X
processing chain starting from the sensor of the source ve-
hicle and ending up at the actor of the destination vehicle.
Especially, they are not considering the receiving path of
beacons. Also the related countermeasures for controlling
internal E/E processing and communication efforts are not
addressed. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the
first one considering these issues and adheres to real-time
constraints that are mandatory for safety applications.
4. V2X MESSAGE EVALUATION DESIGN
In order to allow access to internal E/E artifacts and espe-
cially to the V2X radio interface for evaluating incoming
messages it seems to be likely to realize the methodology as
an intelligent gateway in a dedicated V2X ECU responsible
for V2X related data processing. The proposed methodo-
logy is modeled within an abstract ECU model as illustrated
in Fig. 2 and is mainly made up of five components: 1)
DSRC/WAVE Interface for decoding and encoding WSMs
including BSM 2) E/E architecture interface providing data
to/of other ECUs (e.g. sensor and GPS data of local/remote
vehicle) 3) WSM Scheduler for efficient selection and trans-
mission of local application data or forwarding of safety
critical incoming WSMs 4) Hierarchical Message Evaluation
Stages as core component for data fusion and message evalu-
ation/filtering 5) Network Monitoring capabilities allowing
evaluation of both WSM channels and internal E/E network
utilization.
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Figure 2: V2X Message Evaluation System Design
Since we’re focusing on evaluating and filtering incoming
WSMs, WSM Scheduler is not regarded in the following.
Briefly, the WSM Scheduler implements a simple round robin
scheduling of incoming application data from other ECUs
and crucial WSMs from the evaluation stages. However,
it can be seen as generic building block within the overall
system design and could be refined by relevant and more
complicated beaconing and dissemination approaches like [8]
or [10].
In order to evaluate incoming messages properly, a com-
prehensive view of the environment and traffic situation is
necessary. Based on position, speed etc. received over BSMs
from surrounding vehicles, it is possible to construct a virtual
network which is updated regularly. Two basic approaches
exist to build up such virtual networks: AI , every vehicle
within radio range is used for considering it in evaluation
process, and AII , a fully cluster-based approach where vehi-
cles with similar driving states (for instance position, speed,
direction) are clustered. Thereby only messages from cluster
masters are propagated to other clusters [12, 13], whereas
data from cluster slaves are not. AI provides highest accu-
racy in terms of the virtual environment, since every vehicle
in range is considered. At the same time it demands for
higher processing power and memory capacity on an ECU.
AII is more flexible and scalable, it reduces message appear-
ance but is not suitable for safety-critical purposes, since it
is not ensured that the actual master holds the most relevant
data for every application. Therefore we propose an ad-hoc
cluster-based message evaluation scheme.
4.1 Ad-Hoc Cluster-basedMessage Evaluation
We propose a hybrid cluster-based message evaluation me-
thodology by using a classification into a Farfield Network
(FFN) and Nearfield Network (NFN) database. This adheres
to combine advantages of both approaches AI and AII . NFN
considers all vehicles in close proximity (see Sec. 4) by a
parametrized position range, mainly dependent on current
vehicle state. All vehicles within that range which fulfill
the current acceptance policy becomes a node, i.e. a master
in NFN. All messages are considered for evaluation, since
they potentially contain information for safety-critical situa-
tions and applications, e.g. CACC. In contrast, FFN uses
a cluster-based approach, where vehicles beyond the NFN
area are clustered and are represented by a cluster master
which in turn has its own NFN. Since information from FFN
is potentially used for long-term optimizations or warnings
(e.g. premature reaction to an accident) only messages sent
by FFN masters which fulfill the current acceptance policy
are considered for evaluation. Messages from slaves of the
individual clusters can be discarded inherently. Masters are
determined by simple First Come First Serve principle. This
does not limit the reception of event-driven messages, e.g.
in case of a remote accident, since every master has its own
NFN and could forward those event-driven messages by the
WSM Scheduler as described in Sec. 4. Additionally, our
hybrid cluster approach is completely decentralized as it only
relies on GPS, speed and direction data which is part of
a BSM encapsulated in a WSM. Furthermore the cluster
approach is simple to implement and reduces computational
complexity, which is a prerequisite in order to meet real-time
constraints.
According to the classification into FFN and NFN, the Mes-
sage Evaluation building block in Fig. 2 is refined towards
that classification. There are hierarchical evaluation stages
responsible for FFN and NFN (see Fig. 3). Both comprise
two main components: A Data Fusion Unit and a Filter
Unit. The Data Fusion Unit collects necessary sensor data
from other ECUs in the E/E network, mainly GPS, speed
and radar data, incoming WSMs, and evaluation data of the
external/internal communication monitoring components.
The reasons for the hierarchical evaluation approach are to
handle the complexity of the overall evaluation (divide and
conquer), a better modularity and prefiltering of non-safety
messages in high-density and critical traffic situations. Out
of this data fusion, dedicated acceptance policies for FFN and
NFN are specified. They are dynamically adapted mainly
dependent current vehicle state and network utilization. The
actual Filter Unit uses those policies for comparisons of data
appearing in WSM in order to pass it into the nearfield
evaluation stage, into the internal E/E network or discard it.
In contrast to the Farfield Evaluation Stage, no WSMs are
forwarded at the output of the Nearfield Evaluation Stage,
but application specific data frames, which contain the most
relevant application specific data of the nodes within the
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Figure 3: Refined Message Evaluation Building
Block According to FFN and NFN Classification
NFN. Therewith, an application specific cost function is to
be defined for each application, which weights the data of
each node in the NFN. Finally these frames are periodically
sent over the internal E/E network via the E/E Architecture
Interface to the required safety application like CACC, since
they depend on information updated regularly [6].
The hierarchical clustering and evaluation process is illus-
trated in Fig. 4. Because of the ad-hoc nature of vehicular
networks, both FFN and NFN database must be updated
regularly. It is updated every time a beacon or local sensor
data from other ECUs is received. To limit database size
and thus memory, FFN and NFN databases are deleted and
refreshed respectively. Regarding FFN the whole database is
deleted whereas in case of NFN only the nodes crossing the
defined NF area are deleted. The necessary refresh cycles of
FFN and NFN have been omitted for clarity in Fig. 4. In
the following the cluster-based evaluation process is outlined
in more detail.
4.1.1 FFN and NFN Cost Functions
The processes Update Cluster Master and Update NF Node
in Fig. 4 are part of the Data Fusion Units and are triggered
every time WSM or sensor/GPS data is received. They
update the information position, driving direction, speed,
priority and service identifier (PSID) of the current remote
node entry vj with received WSM data. Afterwards, the
appropriate distance, relative position and driving direction
between local vehicle vi and vj are calculated by means of
local vehicle’s sensor data. These values are then used for
calculating the appropriate cost function of the current node
in FFN and NFN respectively, weighting the relation between
vi and vj . A cost function typically contains sub-functions
evaluating both, mobility data and header data allowing
cross-layer optimizations.
In case of FFN cost function a linear heuristic for long-
term optimization and detection of hot-spots, i.e. congestion
is used. The goal is to set the vehicle into a premature warn-
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Figure 4: Hybrid Clustering and Hierarchical Eval-
uation Strategy
ing state aiming at only accepting safety-relevant messages.
It is calculated between local vehicle vi and each cluster
master vj , ∀j ∈ FFN in the Update Cluster Master process
and is comprising the following sub-functions:
• compDriveDir(): returns 1.0 if the driving direction
of vj is in range of vi, otherwise 0.0. The range is a
parameterizable constant.
• psidEval(): returns 1.0 if the received PSID in the WSM
is contained in the set of cooperative warning messages
defined in IEEE 1609.12, otherwise 0.0. Currently the
following PSIDs are implemented: 0x0005, 0x000C,
0x2000 and 0x8005.
• normDistance(): returns values in [0, 1], where a value
of 1.0 represents the cluster master vj with minimal
distance to vi.
• compRelPos(): returns 1.0 if the relative position of vj
is in range of relative position of vi, otherwise 0.0. The
relative position is represented in polar coordinates and
the range is again a parameterizable constant.
Finally, the cost function CFFi,j between vi and vj results in
CFFi,j = a ∗ compDriveDir() + b ∗ psidEval()
+ c ∗ normDistance() + d ∗ compRelPos() (1)
where a-d are weighting factors in [0.0, 1.0] and a+b+c+d =
1.0. Thereby, a = c = 0.1 is chosen, because cluster master
distance and driving direction of the whole cluster is only of
less importance for hot-spot detection. In contrast, b = 0.5
is chosen since it is essential to detect event-driven warning
messages and d = 0.3 to decide if an accident is basically
possible. Finally, at the end of the Update Cluster Master
process the maximum cost CFFmax = max(C
FF
i,j ), ∀j ∈ FFN is
determined, triggering the driving state FSM which updates
the acceptance policies.
In case of NFN cost function there has to exist a cost
function for each application to be considered in order to
forward the most relevant application specific data to the
appropriate application via the E/E Architecture Interface
(see Fig. 2). In case of safety applications, periodic frames
have to be transmitted over the internal network. In this
work we exemplarily specify a cost function for the CACC
application as used in our case studies. According to [6]
we consider the vehicle ahead with minimum distance and
moving in the same direction as most relevant for CACC.
Therefore the cost function is similar to the FFN cost function.
It is calculated for all neighboring vehicles vj ∈ NFN and is
defined as follows:
CCACCi,j = compDriveDir() ∗ normDistance()
∗ compRelPos() (2)
At the end of the Update NF Node process the maximum
cost CCACCmax = max(C
CACC
i,j ), ∀j ∈ NFN is determined. The
corresponding latest data frame is periodically sent to the
appropriate ECU via the E/E Architecture Interface at a
parameterizable frame rate λ. For CACC this data frame
consists of the distance to and speed of the vehicle ahead
as well as the speed of the local vehicle. The frame rate
is set to λCACC = 0.1s. Note that the ranges for the sub-
functions compDriveDir() and compRelPos() have to be
chosen much smaller than in case of FFN in order to select
the correct vehicle directly ahead even in case of oncoming
traffic. Additionally, if the costs get lower than a small
delta, no vehicle ahead is assumed resulting in maximum
acceleration of the CACC controlled vehicle until a maximum
speed is reached or a vehicle ahead is detected again.
4.1.2 Acceptance Policies
Acceptance Polices are configured in the Data Fusion Units.
They are a set of mobility and header data contained in
BSM and WSM and are defined as ANF = {prio, age, range}
and AFF = {ID, psid, prio, age, range} for nearfield and
farfield respectively. They’re dynamically parameterizable
constants or ranges adjusted in the appropriate Data Fusion
Units compared to the data of current processed WSM in
the Filter Unit as depicted in Fig. 3. Thereby, ID is used
to only accept beacons or WSMs dedicated for the local
vehicle. psid is used for filtering a set of PSIDs. prio is
used to only accept WSMs above or equal to a given priority
ranging from 1 to 7. age limits the time interval elapsed
since transmission and range defines an area range in terms
of x, y, z-coordinates relative to the current position. In case
of ANF range defines the NF area as depicted in Fig. 4.
There are dedicated acceptance policies for FFN and NFN
allowing independent evaluation and filtering in each stage
of possibly different strength. This is necessary e.g. in cases
of high internal network utilization, where only WSMs with
highest priority and nearest range could be accepted in NFN.
Whereas FFN could accept lower prioritized messages used
for cluster optimization but they are not forwarded to the
nearfield stage. For all parameters there are two types of
limits defined: weak and strong.
AFF are mainly determined by the current vehicle state of
the local vehicle represented by an FSM. However, ID is not
set by the FSM. ID contains fixed values for the ID of the
local vehicle and the broadcast ID. The FSM is triggered
every time the Update Cluster Master process is finished
or an update of local speed sensor is received. The FSM is
depicted in Fig. 5. Basically, the FSM consists of a set of four
states, namely city, highway, danger, relaxation. Transitions
between states depend on the current speed retrieved by local
sensors, on the current maximum cost of all cluster masters
retrieved by Update Cluster Master process and on current
wireless network utilization. strong acceptance policies are
set in rather slow traffic situations below a certain speed
limit speedth, i.e. in state city or in potential dangerous
scenarios like congestion (state danger) crossing a cost limit
Cth. weak acceptance policies are only set if there are no
dangerous situations and if the speed crosses speedth. The
state relaxation serves as intermediate state which indicates
relaxing traffic situation, but still has strong policies because
a transition back to danger is still possible.
cityhighway
danger
relaxation
[speed > (speedth + δspeed)] [speed ≤ (speedth - δspeed)]
[Cmax
FF
< (Cth - δC)
|| NUwsm != restricted]
[Cmax
FF
≥ Cth
|| NUwsm == restricted]
[Cmax
FF
≥ Cth
|| NUwsm == restricted]
[speed > (speedth + δspeed)]
[speed ≤ (speedth - δspeed)]
[Cmax
FF
≥ Cth
|| NUwsm == restricted]
Figure 5: Driving State FSM responsible for adjust-
ing AFF
Because of the prefiltering of non-critical messages in poten-
tial dangerous situations in the farfield stage, control of ANF
must only depend on current speed and internal network
utilization. Thereby, if NUee is in restricted mode, strong
policies are applied and only safety related messages (e.g.
BSMs and event-driven warnings) in NF range are passed in
order to relax internal network utilization. To ensure that no
potential safety related message is left unregarded, there is a
minimum NF range, even when strong policies are active.
4.2 Network Monitoring and Evaluation
Network utilization NU(τ) is evaluated by a dedicated cost
function for both WSM wireless channel used as well as for
the internal E/E bus system. They influence the acceptance
policies as described in Sec. 4.1.2. Unlike other approaches,
e.g. [8] or [14], that exploit protocol specific MAC or PHY
characteristics, we use a protocol independent metric to mea-
sure average network utilization. It is based on the average
measured byte rate Bwsm and Bee of actual transferred mes-
sages passing the monitoring units located at the appropriate
interfaces (see Fig. 2 top) within a time interval T . These
are normalized by the maximum nominal byte rate Nwsm
and Nee over the WSM channels and the E/E bus respec-
tively. As WSMP transmits its nominal transmission rate
per WSM, Nwsm is averaged in T , too. Overall, we assume
only that the transmitted message size and the maximum
nominal transmission rate is known, which is the case for
WSM and for most of the protocols used in E/E architectures,
e.g. CAN or LIN. The network utilization is additionally
smoothed linearly [14] resulting in
NUx(τ) = 0.5 ∗NUx(τ − 1) + 0.5 ∗ Bx
Nx
(3)
where x stands for indices wsm and ee. According to [14]
we map the resulting values between 0.0 and 1.0 of NU to
seven discrete states numbered from 1 to 7 indicating network
utilization. If NU falls below a minimum value NUmin, the
channel can be seen as free and is called relaxed. Above a
maximum value NUmax it can be seen as congested and is
called restricted. In case of WSM channel utilization this
also indicates a potentially congested traffic scenario [14].
In between the states are called active and distanced by
(NUmax−NUmin)/5. Thereby, NUmax and NUmin could be
selected by experimental or analytical data of the network. A
transition between states is only done if a certain threshold
NUup and NUdown is exceeded in order to increase state
stability.
5. CASE STUDIES
In the following, a CACC application running on a future
automotive E/E architecture has been chosen as an example
to evaluate our approach. Thereby, two goals are pursued I)
demonstration of a significant reduction of internal network
traffic even in changing traffic situations and II) demon-
stration of accident-free CACC behavior when considering
realistic processing and communication latencies.
5.1 Simulation Setup
The presented case studies are conducted with the co-simula-
tion framework presented in [7]. It is based on Ptolemy II
(PtII) [15] and on a simulation middleware based on the
High-Level Architecture (HLA) [16] enabling distributed
heterogeneous co-simulation. It allows investigation of inter-
dependencies between inter/intra vehicle communication as
well as computation overhead. Therewith the E/E architec-
ture as shown in Fig. 1 of selected vehicles is modeled in PtII.
The evaluated CACC application is running on the Central
ECU. The Wheel ECUs requests the acceleration calculated
by CACC controller and adjusts the desired speed. This
intra-vehicle model is combined with a inter-vehicle model
that is provided by Veins [17] v3.0 simulator. Veins is a
vehicular network simulator that integrates the OMNET++
[18] network simulator with the SUMO [19] traffic simulator.
They’re communicating bidirectionally via TCP/IP. It allows
detailed simulation of IEEE 802.11p/IEEE 1609.x DSRC
PHY and MAC layers including multi-channel operation as
well as node mobility. Veins simulates the surrounding vehi-
cles and the inter-vehicle communication, whereas selected
vehicles can be controlled remotely by PtII. This enables
mobility data as well as beacons to be transferred between
Veins and PtII.
Regarding synchronization a parameter can be set for each
vehicle representing the time interval for updating messages
exchanged with PtII. This comprises necessary sensor and
GPS data as well as beacons that are exchanged. In the dif-
ferent scenarios following these parameters are set to 0.1s, i.e.
10Hz as recommended update rate for CACC applications
according to [6]. For DSRC PHY we use a transmit power of
20dBm in order to reach as many vehicles as possible. As well
path loss and fading models are applied. Receiver sensitivity
is set to −89dBm and thermal noise to −110dBm. For DSRC
MAC we use only the control channel (CCH) to communicate
data at a rate of 6Mbps [20]. Network monitoring parameters
are set to: Nee = 500kbps, NUmin = 0.15, NUmax = 0.40,
NUup = 0.005 and NUdown = 0.02. The strong and weak
acceptance policies of FFN and NFN are set according to
Table 1. We prototypically chose one possible and feasible
parameter set which could be used in real vehicles and traffic
scenarios. Nevertheless, it’s possible to set a various number
of combinatorial possibilities of the parameters.
For the conducted scenarios we’ve constructed an urban
traffic scenario in SUMO consisting of two adjacent lanes,
where vehicles send BSMs at 10Hz. We exemplarily chose
30 vehicles for simulation. Basically, an arbitrary number
of vehicles can be simulated at the cost of simulation time.
The leading vehicle is periodically approaching intersections
Table 1: Acceptance Policy Specification
AFF
weak strong
PSID all safety related
prio all prio(BSM)
range (x, y, z) 300m 150m
age 1s 0.5s
ANF
weak strong
prio all prio(BSM)
range (x, y, z) 300m 100m
age 0.5s 0.2s
with a distance of 200m to each other. The mobility model
of SUMO results in regular deceleration and acceleration
cycles. A second follower vehicle is controlled remotely by
PtII, whose speed is set with the value calculated by the
CACC application. The rest of the vehicles are following
the second one. The traffic simulation is executed with a
fore-run of 10s in order to have an initial vehicle network
for evaluation. The speed and position values of the leading
vehicle required for CACC are transferred to PtII via the
PHY/MAC model of Veins.
5.2 Scenario I
In this scenario the whole platoon described in Sec. 5.1 is
performing a turnaround at the second intersection onto the
opposite lane after about 40s. In Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 the
measurements of CACC are illustrated, showing the speed
and position of the leading vehicle and the second, remotely
controlled, local vehicle. As we can see, the CACC controlled
vehicle is correctly following the leading vehicle with a certain
safety distance. The deceleration and acceleration phases
reflect save approaches towards the intersections. At the
second intersection, the cost function CCACCown,ahead indicates a
maximum acceleration after the leading vehicle has turned
onto the opposite lane (about 38s) until the remote controlled
vehicle itself reaches the intersection (about 42s). Immedi-
ately after the turnaround of the remote controlled vehicle,
the leading vehicle is detected again by the cost function and
CACC is reacting properly even in case of oncoming traffic.
Higher speeds are applied after the turnaround in order to
decrease distance to the leader.
In Fig. 8 the number of overall received WSMs and the
remaining number of messages after each evaluation stage
within a time slot of 2s is illustrated. As we can see, farfield
savings are small (or even zero) at the beginning, since most
of the vehicles are in NF range. As time advances, more
and more vehicles get into FFN. Compared to the overall
number of received WSMs (dark blue bars) this results in a
decreasing number of messages that remain after the farfield
evaluation stage (blue bars). After the turnaround, vehicles
of the oncoming traffic, which were nodes in the FFN be-
fore, join the NF range again. This results in an increasing
number of messages that cannot be discarded in the farfield
evaluation stage and are passed into the nearfield evaluation
stage. Within the farfield stage up to 69, 3% and 37, 0% in
average of all incoming messages are discarded. The constant
number of 20 messages (light blue bars) show the periodic
CACC frames generated in the nearfield evaluation stage.
They correspond to the number of messages injected into
the internal E/E network. This reflects a maximum message
reduction of 96, 6% and 92, 7% in average and corresponds
to a relative average reduction of the internal E/E network
load of 92, 7% (assuming a constant frame size).
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
sp
e
e
d
 [
m
/s
]
Time [s]
speed leader speed local
Figure 6: Speed of the leading vehicle and CACC
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Figure 8: WSM Histogram of the Turnaround Traf-
fic Scenario
5.3 Scenario II
In this scenario an accident is analyzed caused by the leading
vehicle after 30s. At this point in time, the leader sends out
an event-driven warning message with PSID 0x8005 indi-
cating the accident. This results in strong AFF acceptance
policies. Furthermore, in this scenario we’ve especially con-
sidered internal E/E communication and processing latencies.
We’ve generated synthetic internal network traffic in the E/E
architecture model by so called abstract aspects provided
by PtII. This results in restricted NUee state, only allowing
BSMs and event-driven safety messages. According to [21]
the total latency of a WSM should be much less than 100ms.
They define total latency as sensing of an event, communi-
cating it to the target vehicle and taking action either by the
driver or an active safety system. In [4] a ”reception latency”
of < 10ms for e.g. pre-accident sensing events and 10-20ms
for BSMs is proposed. However it’s not precisely defined
what the starting and end point of the reception latency is.
Since there are also latencies on the wireless channel (covered
by Veins model) we therefore modeled a combined internal
preprocessing, processing and communication reception la-
tency of 10ms. This serves as worst case for each received
WSM until data reaches the actual destination processing
unit, i.e. the CACC controller. Thereby, the preprocessing
latency especially reflects necessary signature verifications of
incoming WSMs. In addition, the CACC controller and the
adjustment of the actual speed in the Wheel ECU causes
processing latency. This latency modelling allows us to ana-
lyze how our approach can improve CACC behavior under
realistic real-time latency constraints. In Fig. 9 the mea-
sured speeds of the leading and remote controlled vehicle are
plotted for both cases with and without filtering.
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Figure 9: Speed of the leading vehicle and CACC
controlled local vehicle with and without filtering
Even with only 30 vehicles and low urban speeds, constraints
of 10ms latency of a WSM are not sufficient to meet the
real-time requirements of CACC. This results in erroneous
behavior of CACC. The WSMs of the participating vehi-
cles cause a latency of the WSM of the leader containing
the actual relevant data for CACC. This means the CACC
controller processes potentially obsolete data. Without fil-
tering this ends up in an accident reported by SUMO. This
is indicated in Fig. 9, where the dotted red speed curve
ends after about 35s. It is obvious that in more large-scale
scenarios with hundreds of vehicles and higher speeds, a
latency of 10ms per WSM is by far not sufficient to meet the
real-time constraints of CACC and potentially other safety
applications. When applying our message evaluation strat-
egy only messages that have passed the far- and nearfield
evaluation stage induce the aforementioned latency chain
(preprocessing, processing and network delay). Hereby, we
assume that the evaluation stages induce negligible latencies
compared to those mentioned previously. The dashed green
speed curve in Fig. 9 shows that the reaction time of CACC
with message evaluation and filtering is much smaller than
that of the vehicle without filtering (dotted red curve). Thus
a collision is prevented by asymptotically approaching the
broke down leading vehicle.
6. SHORT DISCUSSION
The case studies show that a significant reduction of mes-
sages that internally need to be processed during run time
can be achieved. Real-time requirements of a safety related
CACC application can be met, even in the presence of both
internal processing and communication latencies as well as
critical traffic situations. Without filtering this could not be
accomplished. Hence we believe that our message evaluation
approach can significantly improve reliability of cooperative
safety applications. In addition, in combination with our
co-simulation framework with detailed traffic and network
models it enables early and reliable design space exploration
of E/E architectures in V2X scenarios. Comparisons with
results of previous approaches (see Sec. 3) is hard, since they
consider a vehicle as a concentrated processing point, ne-
glecting internal E/E architecture issues. However, a deeper
analysis of various parameter settings especially of the ac-
ceptance policies can be addressed in future work (see Sec.
7). These could be additionally evaluated in more complex
and large-scale traffic scenarios. Beyond that, because of the
heavy incoming WSM data traffic at the farfield stage, the
model serves as a foundation for performance and latency
evaluations of future reconfigurable architectures including
3D FPGAs. Out of the model evaluations, design parameters
for those architecture implementations are derived in order
to meet the real-time requirements.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Within this work, a novel V2X message evaluation methodo-
logy based on a vehicle clustering strategy and monitoring
capabilities of both vehicle and internal/wireless network
utilization has been presented. The approach was modeled
as part of a V2X ECU together with a CACC safety applica-
tion as well as with abstract E/E architecture components.
Two case studies with different traffic scenarios served as
proof-of-concept of the approach. Future work comprises
deeper analysis of the acceptance policies in more complex
traffic scenarios. Also analysis of power consumption reduc-
tion of signature verification modules by our approach are
planned by integrating appropriate hardware models into
our co-simulation framework.
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